Africa as "an incomprehensible calamity" and "the most important challenge facing South Africa since the birth of our new democracy".
14 The African Commission on of 1981, which requires State Parties to "take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick".
Many people have died from HIV and AIDS in developing countries -about 30 million plus to date. In some SSA countries AIDS has wiped out entire communities and families. 18 Part of the burden of HIV and AIDS prevalence in SSA is the high number Article 31(f) in order to deny the grant of compulsory licences by members "to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing Member(s)". Article 31bis(3) reiterates the importance of members developing and improving the necessary pharmaceutical production capacity, and interregional assistance in cases where such capacity is lacking. Therefore, a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a compulsory licence by one member may be exported legitimately to the markets of those other developing or least developed country parties to the regional trade agreement "that share the health problem in question".
3
The legislative framework for compulsory licensing systems under the
Canadian and EU access regimes

General
In keeping with the flexibilities introduced to TRIPS in May 2004, Canada passed the
Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act -The Jean Chrétien
Pledge to Africa. 29 The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa, which will from here onwards 
Canada
The CAMR has been described as a historical and ground-breaking "crucial piece of The CAMR resulted from extensive consultation with pharmaceutical industry stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and parliamentarians.
Interestingly, it was also a subject of review in 2007. The review was necessitated by the fact that the new access to the medicine system has never been used since its inception, apparently because of the flaws in the JCPA, which make it unworkable. 
European Union
The EU Regulation, which entered into force on 29 June 2006, has been praised as an indication that the EU has "lived up to the engagement it has made at the Doha Ministerial Conference". 37 The Regulation now enables the manufacture of patented However, the CAMR sets a differential standard and rules for members and nonmembers using the procedure. While WTO member countries need merely to make an application based on a state of emergency, non-member countries need to prove the existence of their state of emergency. Therefore countries which are in serious need of pharmaceutical medicines for HIV and AIDS but are not WTO members may find it challenging to access these medicines under the CAMR.
It is instructive to recall that issues relating to access to medicine received prominence in the WTO after concerns were expressed that the rules of the TRIPS Agreement have the effect of excluding a large number of poor people and developing countries from access to affordable medicine. This situation was compounded by a skewness in the manufacture, pricing and distribution of patented pharmaceutical products, 41 the lack or insufficiency of domestic pharmaceutical research and manufacturing capacity, and the lack of an appropriate legal framework. 42 In this context, the inclusion of non-WTO member countries as eligible importers under the Canadian compulsory licensing scheme should be applauded.
In terms of 21.04(2)(f) of the Patent Act, NGOs and other entities may import pharmaceutical products, provided they get the permission of an eligible importing country. This requirement for having the permission of an eligible importing country has been viewed by NGOs, including the Access to Medicines Movement, 43 as rather unnecessary and burdensome from the perspective of public health. They believe that it limits the role played and that can be played by NGOs and other similar groups in the procurement of essential medicines. 44 However, we are of the opinion that the requirement should be allowed to stand. The importing countries have the responsibility of public-health issues in their territories, and must therefore be allowed the final say in the distribution of medicines within their borders. It is hard to imagine a situation whereby any organisation freely and without any notification to a particular sovereign country distributes and dispenses medicines within the territory of such a country, with complete disregard for the public health system of the country.
EU Resolution
The European Commission had initially proposed to follow the WTO and limit the beneficiary countries to WTO members. The move was mooted, however, as "undesirable" and it was decided that the Resolution should be extended to "all least developed and low-income countries, including those who are not members of the WTO". 45 This compromise was a welcome humanitarian decision which made essential medicine more accessible globally. In terms of Article 4 of the EU Regulation, the beneficiary countries include least-developed countries as designated by the United Nations. As far as NGOs' involvement in the importation is concerned, the Netherlands is one of the few countries in the EU that allows NGOs to import pharmaceutical products without requiring permission from the government of the importing country. 46 It is left to the importing country to determine issues of permision for importing such products. It is submitted that the importing country will in most cases insist on the requisition of such permission as part of its responsibility to ensure that imported medical products are safe for use in its territory.
EIigible pharmaceutical products
The CAMR
In what many have described as the constriction of the pharmaceutical products needs of the importing countries, the CAMR introduced a Schedule 1 for products possible to import under the compulsory system of the CAMR. Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement has been echoed in the CAMR. IPR holders are entitled to remuneration upon the licensing of their patents. However, no formula for the calculation of the remuneration is provided.
The EU Provision
Unlike the TRIPS and the CAMR, the EU Regulation provides for a formula to calculate adequate remuneration. In terms of Article 10(9)(a) of the Regulation, remuneration is limited to 4% of the price paid by the importing country when pharmaceutical products concerned are used in situations of national health emergencies without prior negotiation. Article 10(9)(b) permits a different approach in situations that cannot be described as constituting national emergencies. In this regard the 4% remuneration ceiling may be applied, but the authority granting the compulsory licence may base the amount of renumeration payable on any other considerations, including the economic value of the intended use under license to the importing country, and the humanitarian or non-commercial circumstances relating to the intended use. Canada exported mecidines to Rwanda shows that the flexibility system is a "complete failure".
Safety
65
These criticisims are very interesting, because they hardly address alternative access regimes, and fall short of considering the role played by other factors in the failure of the compulsory licensing system for pharmaceutical products, such as the patents' monopoly. The criticism tends to be oblivious to the opportunities presented by these measures to assist in the alleviation of the disease burden in countries in SSA. Some of the arguments are not entirely valid and lack substance. They fail to acknowledge the important incentives and benefits that can be reaped by taking advantage of these flexibilities from the perspective of access to health as a human right instead of the purely commercial perspective.
Let us consider the following: TRIPS sets out minimum standards for the protection of all WTO members, including a substantial increase in terms of patent protection with product patent replacing process patent in all fields including pharmaceutical products. 66 The fundamental purpose and the value of the patent protection system cannot be underestimated. The patent protection system provides the IPR holder with a monopoly on the invention, expecting that the value to broader society would be the encouragement of innovation. 67 However, the system has some undesirable consequences. There are several challenges to accessing patented and off-patent medicines, some of which are attributable to the primarily profit-driven conduct of the pharmaceutical sector. Firstly, the high prices charged by IPR holders and related competitive behaviours impede access to essential medicine. 68 This has led to jurisdictions like the EC undertaking an enquiry into the practices of the pharmaceutical sector. 69 It is noteworthy in the context of this paper that the EC Report found that IPR holders contribute to the delay in the production, dissemination and access to generic medicines through using a "variety of instruments to extend the life of their medicines". 70 The strategies include dilatory patent-filling strategies; 71 patent-related exchanges and litigation; 72 and patent settlement in which the marketing capacity of the generic sector is restricted. 
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